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COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR
CONCEPTUALLY SEPARABLE
ARTISTIC FEATURES POST-STAR
ATHLETICA: A USEFUL ARTICLE ON
USEFUL ARTICLES
DAAN G. ERIKSON*
ABSTRACT
In the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Star Athletica v. Varsity
Brands in 2017, U.S. federal district courts and the Copyright Office Review Board
have grappled with the Supreme Court’s reimagined conceptual separability test for
determining the copyrightability of artistic aspects of useful articles. An
examination of the decisions in the first eighteen months post-Star Athletica reveals
district courts have interpreted the Supreme Court’s guidance inconsistently, with
some courts adding language to the test and even using overruled portions of
previous tests. The author takes an empirical approach to evaluating such decisions
and the trends that emerge from them. The examined range begins at the issuance
of the Star Athletica decision in March 2017 and ends in mid-October 2018.
Because courts continue to struggle to define protectable elements of useful articles
despite the Supreme Court’s guidance, the author proposes that Congress should
enhance the conceptual separability test in the Next Great Copyright Act. In the
meantime, litigants may take some lessons from Star Athletica, such as to examine
whether the object even constitutes a useful article and to disregard artistic judgment
and the remainder of a useful object aside from the separable design. Also, litigants
* Associate, Husch Blackwell LLP. B.A., 2009, New York University, Gallatin School of
Individualized Study; Visiting J.D. Student, 2011-2012, Fordham Law School; J.D., 2012, Loyola Law
School, Los Angeles. The author wishes to thank Professor Hugh C. Hansen for giving him his first job
after law school at the Fordham IP Institute and for imparting his copyright and legal realist wisdom.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not necessarily those of his employer or
its clients.
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may consider the guidance that emerges from lower court cases, such as the “primary
function” test from Judge Forrest of the Southern District of New York.
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INTRODUCTION

In the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Star Athletica v.
Varsity Brands in 2017,1 U.S. federal district courts and the Copyright Office
Review Board (“CORB”) have grappled with the Supreme Court’s
reimagined conceptual separability test for determining the copyrightability
of artistic aspects of useful articles. An examination of the decisions in the
first eighteen months post-Star Athletica reveals that district courts have
interpreted the Supreme Court’s guidance inconsistently, with some courts
adding language to the test and even using overruled portions of previous
tests.2
Lower courts do not always follow the Supreme Court in intellectual
property cases.3 While the United States Supreme Court’s Star Athletica
ruling directed courts on what not to consider in analyzing conceptual
separability, in the first eighteen months after Star Athletica, with one
exception, no district court’s issued decision follows the Supreme Court’s
guidance to the letter of the law.4
The author’s empirical review of all relevant federal court decisions
referencing the Supreme Court’s decision in the first eighteen months after
Star Athletica reveals that some lower courts still use overruled tests or sua
sponte embellishments. For example, some look to physical separability,5 at
least one judge has used his own artistic judgment,6 another court has
embellished the test and looked to whether the “primary purpose” of the
separable design feature is functional or artistic,7 and another ties in scènes
à faire analysis of the “genre” of a work.8
When federal courts and the CORB determine copyrightability, their
originality analysis closely follows the conceptual separability analysis (i.e.,
is the conceptually separable part of a utilitarian object sufficiently original

1. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017).
2. See infra Section III.
3. See Hugh C. Hansen, International Copyright: An Unorthodox Analysis, 23 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 447, 458–59 (2013).
4. See infra Section III.
5. See, e.g., Triangl Grp. Ltd. v. Jiangmen City Xinhui Dist. Lingzhi Garment Co., Ltd., No. 16
Civ. 1498 PGG, 2017 WL 2829752, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2017).
6. See Inhale Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-03838-ODW (FFM), 2017 WL 4163990,
at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2017).
7. Jetmax Ltd. v. Big Lots, Inc., No. 15-cv-9597 (KBF), 2017 WL 3726756, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
28, 2017).
8. Silvertop Assocs., Inc. v. Kangaroo Mfg., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 3d 754, 768 n.11 (D.N.J. 2018).
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to merit copyright protection?),9 though courts can decide separability
without deciding originality.10
The Copyright Office typical sets the threshold of originality higher
than federal courts.11 The author’s empirical review of all relevant CORB
decisions in the examined time frame post-Star Athletica (March 2017 to
mid-October 2018) reveals that the CORB grants protection to sufficiently
original artistic features that readily appear physically separable.12 Cases
concerning more integrated features present greater challenges to courts and
the Copyright Office.13 Such cases can result in muddled rulings that lean
more heavily on the originality analysis than the question of whether the
features are conceptually separable.14 Also, courts and the CORB also seem
challenged by two-dimensional, pictorial and graphic works that depict
useful objects, sometimes mistakenly applying the separability analysis to
such works.15
Overall, the author’s analysis reveals that courts continue to struggle
with conceptual separability despite any clarification from the U.S. Supreme
Court in Star Athletica. Viewing the examples in the examined period,
Congress may take up revisions in the Next Great Copyright Act, a
development envisioned by former Register of Copyrights Maria Pallante,16
to clarify the conceptual separability test and refine the definition of “useful
article.”17 The author suggests Congress may incorporate some of the
9. See infra Sections III and V.
10. See, e.g., Jetmax Ltd., 2017 WL 3726756, at *6.
11. See, e.g., Roberta Horton, The Threshold of Copyright Protection After American Airlines,
LAW360 (Feb. 26, 2018, 2:17 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1013278/the-threshold-ofcopyright-protection-after-american-airlines (“In our view, the courts have adopted more liberal
standards for evaluating creativity than has the Copyright Office, reflecting a tension between the
agency’s determinations and the courts’ more reasonable interpretations of ‘creativity.’”).
12. See, e.g., Trillane Strand, CORB Decision at 3 (July 27, 2017); Amaca, CORB Decision at 2
(July 27, 2017); Wanderer, CORB Decision at 2 (Nov. 28, 2017).
13. See, e.g., Ross v. Apple, Inc., No. 17-13712, 2018 WL 3409988 (11th Cir. July 12, 2018), cert.
denied, No. 18-494, 2018 WL 5044841 (U.S. Dec. 3, 2018) (mem.); Silvertop Assocs., Inc., 319 F. Supp.
3d at 754; Pendant Lamp – 76, CORB Decision at 2–3 (Apr. 4, 2018); Floor Liner, CORB Decision at 2–
3 (Apr. 19, 2018); UR5, CORB Decision (Oct. 23, 2017).
14. See, e.g., Ross, 2018 WL 3409988; Silvertop Assocs. Inc., 319 F. Supp. 3d at 759; Pendant Lamp
– 76, CORB Decision at 2–3 (Apr. 4, 2018); Floor Liner, CORB Decision at 2–3 (Apr. 19, 2018); UR5,
CORB Decision at 1 (Oct. 23, 2017).
15. See, e.g., Ross, 2018 WL 3409988; Glass Egg Dig. Media v. Gameloft, Inc., No. 17-cv-04165MMC, 2018 WL 3659259 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2018); Arlon FESPA/ISA 2014 Trade Show, CORB
Decision at 1 (Dec. 14, 2017).
16. Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 315 (2013) (the
author notes he was present to hear Register Pallante deliver her address at the 2013 Horace S. Manges
Lecture, transcribed in the cited law journal article); see also The Register’s Call for Updates to U.S.
Copyright Law: Hearing before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, Intell. Prop. and the Internet of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 4–38 (2013) (statement of Maria A. Pallante, Register of
Copyrights, the U.S. Copyright Office).
17. See infra Section V.
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language a district court judge found helpful to determine if a feature is
“primarily” functional or artistic.18
In the meantime, litigants may take some lessons from Star Athletica,
such as to examine whether the object even constitutes a useful article and
to disregard artistic judgment and the remainder of a useful object aside from
the separable design.19 Also, litigants may consider the guidance that
emerges from lower court cases, such as the “primary function” test from
Judge Forrest of the Southern District of New York.20
II. OVERVIEW OF THE STAR ATHLETICA DECISION
A. Background and Brief History of Conceptual Separability
Copyright law allows protection for, among other kinds of works,
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.21 However, copyright law does not
protect useful articles.22
The Copyright Act of 1976 codified the test for, broadly speaking,
whether certain decorative features of useful articles could be copyrighted.23
The test codified the spirit of the Supreme Court’s decision in Mazer v.
Stein,24 and included some language from the Copyright Office’s regulation
it promulgated following Mazer.25
By the time of Star Athletica, different circuit courts and scholars used
at least nine different tests, with courts in the same circuit sometimes even

18. Jetmax Ltd. v. Big Lots, Inc., No. 15-cv-9597 (KBF), 2017 WL 3726756, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
28, 2017). See Section III(D) infra for further discussion.
19. See infra Sections II and V.
20. See infra Section III(D).
21. 17 U.S.C. § 102.
22. Id. §§ 101, 113. Also, it remains an open question whether copyright law should protect such
objects. That said, copyright law does provide sui generis protection for two kinds of useful article, boat
hulls and semiconductor chip layouts. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq. & 901 et seq. Also, when Congress
revised the Copyright Act in 1976, it declined to enact sui generis protection for “industrial designs.”
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 50, 54–55 (1976).
23. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 & 113.
24. 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (holding a statute of a dancer copyrightable notwithstanding the fact
that it was used as the base of a lamp). In codifying the holding from Mazer, Congress sought to
“encompass all original pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works that are intended to be or have been
embodied in useful articles, regardless of factors such as mass production, commercial exploitation, and
the potential availability of design patent protection.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 54 (1976). Further
discussion of other areas of intellectual property that may protect non-functional aspects of useful articles
falls outside the scope of this article.
25. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1960) (“If the sole intrinsic function of an article is its utility, the fact
that the article is unique and attractively shaped will not qualify it as a work of art. However, if the shape
of a utilitarian article incorporates features, such as artistic sculpture, carving, or pictorial representations,
which can be identified separately and are capable of existing independently as a work of art, such features
will be eligible for registration.”).
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diverging, as courts struggled with the best language to protect creators of
various useful articles that featured decorative elements.26
Congress and the Copyright Office have historically considered
clothing a useful article.27 Accordingly, copyright law cannot protect the cut
or style of clothing, though it can protect patterns.28
Star Athletica concerned whether the designs on cheerleading uniforms
were conceptually separable from the useful article such that the designs
could be protectable under copyright law. The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to clarify the proper test.29
B. Back to the Statute? The Supreme Court’s Test
Justice Thomas authored the opinion of the court, which also included
Justices Roberts, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan.30 Justice Ginsburg
concurred;31 Justice Breyer dissented and Justice Kennedy joined Justice
Breyer’s dissent.32
Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas held:
[A]n artistic feature of the design of a useful article is eligible for
copyright protection if the feature (1) can be perceived as a two- or
three-dimensional work of art separate from the useful article and (2)
would qualify as a protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work
either on its own or in some other medium if imagined separately
from the useful article.33

Justice Thomas’s two-part test closely mirrors the language of the statute:
[T]he design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be
considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only
to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are

26. See Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, L.L.C., 779 F.3d 468, 484–85 (6th Cir. 2015)
(discussing various tests).
27. See Registrability of Costume Designs, 56 Fed. Reg. 56,530, 56,531 (Nov. 5, 1991); U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 311.1 (3d ed. 2017); see
also 11 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 924.3(A) (2018).
28. COMPENDIUM (THIRD) § 618.4(C).
29. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1823 (Mem) (2016).
30. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1007 (2017).
31. Id. at 1018 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 1030 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 1016.
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capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the
article.34

The small differences in language are perhaps negligible, for example,
Justice Thomas’s “can be perceived” as compared with the statute’s “can be
identified.” The Supreme Court’s new test adds some language about the
artistic feature qualifying as a “protectable” pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
(“PGS”)35 work if “imagined separately” rather than that the examined
features merely must be “capable of existing independently” from “the
utilitarian aspects of the article.”
Query whether and how a design could meet the second prong,
qualifying as a “protectable” PGS work, and simultaneously not satisfy the
statutory originality requirement.36 Apparently, the Supreme Court saw no
confusion on the point since it declined to express an opinion on originality
and “any other prerequisite of a valid copyright” in the case, indicating that
the separability test does not contemplate such matters.37
Also, as quoted above, one part of the Supreme Court’s opinion holds
“an artistic feature of the design of a useful article is eligible for copyright
protection if the feature [meets the two-part test],”38 while another part of the
Supreme Court’s opinion prefaced its test with language that “a feature
incorporated into the design of a useful article is eligible for copyright
protection only if the feature . . . [meets the two-part test].”39 In other words,
in the first instance, separability may be sufficient to an artistic aspect of a
useful article’s qualifying for copyright protection, but in the second
instance, separability is necessary, but not sufficient. In light of the Supreme
Court’s comments on declining to express an opinion on other prerequisites
of a valid copyright, notwithstanding the somewhat confusing and
contradictory language, courts and litigants may consider separability
necessary but not sufficient to copyrightability and may consider the
originality analysis completely separate from the separability test.
In the author’s opinion, the most useful guidance in Star Athletica lies
in that the Supreme Court overruled previous tests and explicitly rejected
certain considerations, as discussed below.40

34. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
35. The Supreme Court abbreviates “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural” as “PGS.”
36. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works
of authorship . . . .”)
37. Star Athletica, L.L.C., 137 S. Ct. at 1012 n.1.
38. Id. at 1016 (emphasis added).
39. Id. at 1007 (emphasis added).
40. See infra Section II(D).
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C. Concurrence and Dissent
Due to the complicated history of the conceptual separability test and
the struggles courts continue to face, the Star Athletica concurrence and
dissent merit brief discussion.
1. Justice Ginsburg’s Concurrence
Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence emphasized that the Court need not
have opined on conceptual separability at all.41 She noted that the registered
designs are two-dimensional works “reproduced on useful articles” not
“designs of useful articles.”42 In other words, “[b]ecause the owner of a
copyright in a pre-existing PGS work may exclude a would-be infringer from
reproducing that work on a useful article, there is no need to engage in any
separability inquiry to resolve” the case.43 To support her claim, Justice
Ginsburg reproduced copies of Varsity Brands’s copyright applications as
an appendix to her opinion, showing that Varsity Brands filed to register its
designs as “2-dimensional artwork” and more specifically in some cases as
“fabric design (artwork).”44
Despite Justice Ginsburg’s keen observations, no lower court in the
examined time period incorporated her analysis into an opinion. Yet her
guidance reminds future litigants to consider the nature of the works at issue
carefully. Courts should view her remarks as a reminder of the doctrine’s
subject matter limitations.45
2. Justice Breyer’s Dissent
Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justice Kennedy, writing about cat
lamps and shovels as art.46 Of course, in light of the majority’s new test, it
does not matter if a cat lamp base statue holds up the lamp or not, because
the clarified test ignores the remainder of the object left behind, and only
looks at the registrability of the conceptually separable portion.

41. Star Athletica, L.L.C., 137 S. Ct. at 1018 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
42. Id. (emphasis in original).
43. Id.
44. See id. at 1019–29.
45. See id. at 1019 (“In short, Varsity’s designs are not themselves useful articles meet for
separability determination under § 101; they are standalone PGS works that may gain copyright protection
as such, including the exclusive right to reproduce the designs on useful articles.”) But see, e.g., Glass
Egg Dig. Media v. Gameloft, Inc., No. 17-cv-04165-MMC, 2018 WL 3659259 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2018)
(referencing Star Athletica in connection with a computer model work); see infra Section III(H) for
further analysis of Glass Egg Dig. Media; see also infra Sections III(G)(2), IV(C)(3).
46. Star Athletica, L.L.C., 137 S. Ct. at 1030 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Some district courts do wrestle with Justice Breyer’s concerns about art
anyway.47 However, the question is not whether a shovel can be art. Before
performing the separability analysis involving an assessment of whether a
feature “can be perceived as a two- or three-dimensional work of art,” the
test requires examining only the “artistic feature” separate from the overall
useful article.48 Relatedly, copyright law in its current form cannot protect
many aesthetically pleasing articles where form and function cannot be
separated even conceptually.49
D. Takeaways from the Supreme Court’s Holding
The Supreme Court issued significant guidance about what courts, the
Copyright Office, and litigants should and should not consider with regard
to determining the copyrightability of decorative portions of useful articles.
After removing the conceptually separable design, a useful article need not
remain.50 Courts and the Copyright Office now need focus only on any
separable part, not any “left behind” parts. Further, Justice Thomas
abrogated any distinction between physical separability and conceptual
separability, holding conceptual separability covers all considerations.51
Justice Thomas also confirmed that courts cannot consider artistic judgment
(neither the artist’s purpose nor the judge’s view of marketability).52
To be clear, the Supreme Court’s test reverberates far beyond the
reaches of fashion law, though the Supreme Court made sure to confirm that
the shape, cut, and physical dimensions of clothing are still not eligible for
copyright.53
E. District Court Decision Dismissing Counterclaims and Complaint
The Supreme Court did not express any opinion on the copyrightability
of the cheerleading uniform designs, leaving any evaluation of originality to
the district court.54 The district court reopened the case to resolve any

47. See, e.g., Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-03838-ODW (FFM), 2017 WL
4163990 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2017).
48. Star Athletica L.L.C., 137 S. Ct. at 1016.
49. See, e.g., Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1147–48 (2d Cir.
1987).
50. Star Athletica L.L.C., 137 S. Ct. at 1013–14.
51. Id. at 1013.
52. Id. at 1015.
53. Id. at 1016.
54. Id. at 1012 n.1.
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remaining issues, such as whether the designs at issue in the case were
protected by copyright.55
In reopening the case, the district court avoided answering the question
of originality.56 Star Athletica had counterclaimed that Varsity’s designs
were unoriginal such that copyright law could not protect them.57 However,
instead of determining whether such designs satisfied the originality
requirement and could be protected, the district court characterized the
counterclaim as an affirmative defense, which it could review in its
discretion under precedent, but which it chose not to review.58
Therefore, the district court dismissed the remaining counterclaims
without deciding if the designs on the cheerleading uniforms met the
threshold of originality required to merit copyright protection.59 In an
unusual move, the district court allowed the plaintiff to settle the case with
the defendant’s insurance company, over the defendant’s objections.60
Accordingly, while we have a new test for conceptual separability, we do not
have new guidance on whether such simple designs constitute copyrightable
expression.
III. FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS AFTER STAR ATHLETICA
To review lower court interpretations in the first eighteen months postStar Athletica, the author looked to those cases from March 2017 to midOctober 2018 that quoted the decision and involved at least a purported
useful article, and also examined any later developments in the Star Athletica
case specifically.
Eight relevant federal court opinions in the examined period post-Star
Athletica cite the Supreme Court’s decision regarding its new test for the
conceptual separability analysis. Of the eight relevant decisions, the first in
time is dicta,61 the second mirrors the Supreme Court’s language,62 the third

55. Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, L.L.C., No. 10-02508, 2017 WL 3446292, at *1 (W.D.
Tenn. Aug. 10, 2017).
56. Id. at *2.
57. Id.
58. Id. at *1–3.
59. Id. at *3.
60. Id. at *1–3; see also Bill Donohue, Weird Cheerleader Copyright Settlement Finalized, LAW360
(June 20, 2018, 10:29 PM), https://www.law360.com/ip/articles/1055819.
61. Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-03838-ODW (FFM), 2017 WL 4163990, at
*2–3 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2017).
62. Design Ideas, Inc. v. Meijer, Inc., No. 15-cv-03093, 2017 WL 2662473, at *2–3 (C.D. Ill. June
20, 2017).
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addresses the issue in a spoken order entering a default judgment,63 the fourth
addresses conceptual separability but not originality at summary judgment,64
the fifth remains ongoing as of this writing and does not include significant
substantive evaluation of conceptual separability,65 the sixth contains
extensive separability analysis,66 the seventh contains a brief separability
analysis,67 and the eighth cites Star Athletica as the lodestar for separability
analysis but does not appear to involve a useful article and contains no
substantive analysis of useful articles.68 In the examined time frame, five of
the six issued opinions that do substantively evaluate conceptual separability
include language not found in the Supreme Court’s test,69 perhaps indicating
the need for courts to supplement or augment the Supreme Court’s guidance.
A. Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc.
1. Background
Judge Wright of the Central District of California heard a motion to
reconsider from plaintiff Inhale, Inc., requesting that the court reopen the
case in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Star Athletica.70
Previously, the Central District of California and the Ninth Circuit
found that the shape of the hookah water container and its function were not
conceptually separable and thus the water container was not copyrightable:
“the shape of a container is not independent of the container’s utilitarian
function.”71 Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.72

63. Triangl Grp. Ltd. v. Jiangmen City Xinhui Dist. Lingzhi Garment Co., Ltd., No. 16 Civ. 1498
PGG, 2017 WL 2829752, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2017).
64. Jetmax Ltd. v. Big Lots, Inc., No. 15-cv-9597 (KBF), 2017 WL 3726756, at *4–6 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 28, 2017).
65. See Lego A/S v. Best-Lock Constr. Toys, Inc., No. 3:11-cv-01586 (CSH), 2017 WL 6540268,
at *6 n.6 (D. Conn. Dec. 21, 2017).
66. Silvertop Assocs., Inc. v. Kangaroo Mfg., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 3d 754, 762–65 (D.N.J. 2018).
67. Ross v. Apple, Inc., No. 17-13712, 2018 WL 3409988, at *3 (11th Cir. July 12, 2018), cert.
denied, No. 18-494, 2018 WL 5044841 (U.S. Dec. 3, 2018) (mem.).
68. Glass Egg Dig. Media v. Gameloft, Inc., No. 17-cv-04165-MMC, 2018 WL 3659259, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2018).
69. See Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-03838-ODW (FFM), 2017 WL 4163990,
at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2017); Triangl Grp. Ltd. v. Jiangmen City Xinhui Dist. Lingzhi Garment Co.,
Ltd., No. 16 Civ. 1498 PGG, 2017 WL 2829752, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2017); Jetmax Ltd., 2017 WL
3726756, at *6; Silvertop Assocs., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 3d at 764–65; Ross, 2018 WL 3409988, at *4.
70. See Inhale, Inc., 2017 WL 4163990, at *1.
71. Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., 755 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 2014), aff’g No. 2:11-cv03838-ODW(FFMx), 2012 WL 2321573, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 18, 2012).
72. Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 758 (Mem) (2014).
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On the motion for rehearing, Judge Wright denied the motion to
reconsider.73 “At some point, all cases must end. Inhale does not seem to
understand this, as it moves to reopen this proceeding five years after the
Court’s initial case dispositive summary judgment order, and approximately
three years after its unsuccessful appeals to the Ninth Circuit and the
Supreme Court.”74 The emphasized language indicates things did not look
good for Inhale.
The court then indicated that Inhale did not cite any relevant, binding
authority from non-habeas civil cases where the courts reopened the cases
based on a change in the law years after a final decision and exhaustion of
the appeals process.75 The court distinguished and was not persuaded by
persuasive authority.76
The court declined to reconsider the case under the rationale that to do
so “would seriously undermine the finality of judgments and open the
floodgates of litigation by encouraging any disgruntled litigant to file a Rule
60(b)(6) motion if they believe there has been even a tangentially-related
change in law.”77
2. Application of Star Athletica and Conceptual Separability
Analysis
Following Judge Wright’s denial of the motion to reconsider, Judge
Wright authored significant conceptual separability analysis based on the
Supreme Court’s test in Star Athletica. “Alternatively, the Court denies
Inhale’s motion because application of the Star Athletica test would not
change the outcome of the underlying proceeding.”78 However, all of his
analysis amounts to dicta in light of his denial of the motion to reconsider.
Judge Wright correctly noted that the U.S. Supreme Court “explicitly
abrogated a number of other tests, including the physical separability test and
the designer’s perspective test, each of which factored into this Court’s
original decision.”79 He went on to criticize Inhale for claiming copyright in
the water container as a whole and not any subset of its features,80
73. Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-03838-ODW (FFM), 2017 WL 4163990, at
*1 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2017).
74. Id. at *2 (emphasis added).
75. Id. at *2.
76. Id.
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at *3 (“Inhale fails to point out a sculptural feature of the water container or a subset of
features of the water container that may serve as the predicate for application of the Star Athletica test; it
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notwithstanding the fact that Inhale owned a copyright registration for the
water container as a sculptural work.81 See Inhale’s hookah water container
below on the left and those of Starbuzz Tobacco in the center and on the
right.82

The court noted, “Inhale lost the ability to claim that the water container
as a whole constitutes a piece of ‘modern sculpture,’ a ‘museum piece’ or
‘standalone’ work of art when it agreed in the underlying proceeding that the
water container was a useful article.”83 However, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that artistic judgment and intent is irrelevant;84 therefore whether Inhale
claimed the water container as a “modern sculpture” or “museum piece”
appears irrelevant. Further, legislative history shows that Congress intended
to disregard “factors such as mass production” and “commercial
exploitation” in determining the availability of copyright protection for PGS
works.85
seeks protection not for any particular feature of the water container but for the way the features as a
whole ‘are arranged to form [the] hookah water container.’”).
81. Complaint at Ex. A, Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-03838-ODW(FFMx),
2012 WL 2321573 (C.D. Cal. June 18, 2012).
82. Id. at Ex. C.
83. Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-03838-ODW (FFM), 2017 WL 4163990, at
*3 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2017).
84. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1015 (2017).
85. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 50, 54 (1976).
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The court then stated it was left to determine if “any of the water
container’s features individually, or a subset of those features” could be
perceived as a two- or three-dimensional work of art separate from the useful
article.86 Judge Wright wrote that they could not be, as “they are essentially
geometric shapes of the most common type.”87
“Combining two or three of these common geometric shapes together
does little to improve the situation–the components of the water container at
issue are simply not works of art in even the broadest, most liberal sense.”88
Judge Wright cited to Copyright Office’s restrictive language in the
Compendium II.89 However, while the Star Athletica test does include the
wording “work of art,” the Supreme Court rejected artistic judgment as part
of the separability analysis, implying the test targets instead the distinction
between utilitarian and non-utilitarian features.90 Further, the author submits
that it may be open for discussion whether the hookah water container is only
a combination of common shapes, or whether nearly anything on the planet,
for that matter, is arguably composed of a combination of common shapes.
Judge Wright went on to opine, “This is not to say that there are not
some, if not many, useful articles composed of unique geometric shapes
variations or unique combinations of geometric shapes that might pass
muster under the Star Athletica test.”91 While Judge Wright cited to the
Compendium II, his assessment still amounts only to dicta. “It is only to say
that the water container at issue here is no Noguchi Table.”92 The judge
inserted in his decision the image of a Noguchi table, reproduced below.93

86. Inhale, Inc., 2017 WL 4163990, at *3.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See id. (citing U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES
§ 503.02(a) (2d ed. 1984) as “indicating that ‘common’ geometric shapes by themselves are not
copyrightable”).
90. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1015 (2017).
91. Inhale, Inc., 2017 WL 4163990, at *3 (emphasis in original).
92. Inhale, Inc., 2017 WL 4163990, at *3.
93. Id.
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Query, what is conceptually separable about a Noguchi table apart from
its useful parts? The author posits that the judge’s opinion smacks of high art
artistic judgment, not allowed by Star Athletica, and that the judge rejected
copyrightability here at least in part due to the pedestrian nature of the
product.94
Judge Wright would do well to remember Justice Holmes’s wise words
concerning another type of copyrightable work, quoted also by the Supreme
Court in Star Athletica, “It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons
trained only to the law to constitute themselves the final judges of the worth
of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”95
B. Design Ideas, Ltd. v. Meijer, Inc.
1. Background
Plaintiff Design Ideas, Ltd. brought suit against the various defendants
in the Central District of Illinois, alleging copyright infringement of its
“sparrow clip” clothespins.96 See plaintiff’s work below on top and
defendants’ on the bottom.97
94. Cf. L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 488 (2d Cir. 1976) (affirming judgment of
“Uncle Sam” toy bank as insufficiently original to merit copyright protection).
95. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903); see also Star Athletica,
L.L.C., 137 S. Ct. at 1015 (citing Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251).
96. Design Ideas, Ltd. v. Meijer, Inc., No. 15-cv-03093, 2017 WL 2662473, at *1 (C.D. Ill. June
20, 2017). In the interest of full disclosure, the author notes that his law firm participated in representing
the defendants in this case at the time of the June 20, 2017 decision. Accordingly, the author does not
comment on the decision beyond the short factual description contained herein.
97. Complaint at 4, 10, 12, Design Ideas, Ltd. v. Meijer, Inc., No. 15-cv-03093, 2017 WL 2662473,
at *1 (C.D. Ill. June 20, 2017).
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Before the Supreme Court decided Star Athletica, Judge Myerscough
granted partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.98 She found that
the sparrow clip design qualified for copyright protection as it was original
and that “the bird design was both physically and conceptually separable
from the utilitarian aspect of the work.”99
2. Application of Star Athletica and Conceptual Separability Analysis
Judge Myerscough’s decision here did not change in any material way
after Star Athletica, finding that the bird portion of the sparrow clip met both
prongs of the Supreme Court’s test, mirroring the language exactly.100
98. Design Ideas, Ltd. v. Meijer, Inc., No. 15-cv-03093, 2016 WL 4487830, at *15 (C.D. Ill. Aug.
25, 2016).
99. Design Ideas, Ltd. v. Meijer, Inc., No. 15-cv-03093, 2017 WL 2662473, at *1 (C.D. Ill. June
20, 2017) (citing Design Ideas, Ltd., 2016 WL 4487830, at *15).
100. Id. at *2–3 (“First, the bird portion can be perceived as a three-dimensional work of art separate
from the useful article. One can identify the bird portion as having pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
qualities. Second, the bird portion would qualify as a protectable sculptural work on its own if it were
imaged separately from the useful article into which it is incorporated. The bird portion would be eligible
for copyright protection as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work had it been originally fixed in some
tangible medium other than attached to the clothespin.”)
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Then, she rejected the defendants’ arguments that the bird portion of
the sparrow clip is itself useful, stating poetically and rhetorically, “once the
bird portion is removed from the clothespin, what is the usefulness of
hanging the bird from a rod or hanging the bird on a string by its beak?”101
She cited and quoted the Compendium III for the proposition that “a
sculpture does not become a useful article simply because it could be used
as a doorstop or a paperweight.”102
C. Triangl Group Ltd. v. Jiangmen City Xinhui District Lingzhi
Garment Co., Ltd.
1. Background
Triangl Group, a purveyor of women’s swimwear, filed suit in the
Southern District of New York against the various defendants for copying
the black T-shaped designs featured on bikini tops and black trim featured
on the bikini tops and bottoms, alleging copyright, trademark, and trade dress
infringement.103
In fact, Triangl Group noted in its complaint that not only had the
defendants copied its designs and sold nearly identical bikinis under a
different mark and company name at a cheaper price, but the defendants also
copied Triangl Group’s actual online catalog photographs and reproduced
them on the website where they sold their infringing products.104 See below.

101. Id. at *3. The author credits Thomas Kjellberg of Cowan, Liebowitz & Latman, P.C. for his
interpretation of Judge Myerscough’s words as beat poetry at the Copyright Society of the USA’s Annual
Meeting in June 2018.
102. Id. (quoting U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES §
924.1 (3d ed. revised Dec. 22, 2014)). Judge Myerscough quoted the then-current edition of the
Compendium III; the Copyright Office subsequently amended the Compendium III and removed this
language in a revision dated September 29, 2017.
103. Triangl Grp. Ltd. v. Jiangmen City Xinhui Dist. Lingzhi Garment Co., Ltd., No. 16 Civ. 1498
PGG, 2017 WL 2829752, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2017).
104. Complaint at 3, Triangl Grp. Ltd. v. Jiangmen City Xinhui Dist. Lingzhi Garment Co., Ltd., No.
16 Civ. 1498 PGG, 2017 WL 2829752, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2017).
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Plaintiff’s website with its bikini design appears above on the left and
defendants’ website appears above on the right.105 The defendants essentially
defaulted.106 In an order issued from the bench, Judge Gardephe granted
plaintiff Triangl Group Limited’s application for default judgment and a
permanent injunction based on copyright, trademark, and trade dress
infringement.107
2.

Application of Star Athletica and Conceptual Separability
Analysis

In finding copyright infringement, Judge Gardephe held:
Here plaintiffs have properly alleged that the images of their products
at issue are copyrightable works owned by plaintiffs, and in light of
Star Athletica, it appears most of plaintiffs’ designs are copyrightable
because the decorative black trim and T-shape are physically
separable and demonstrable as works of art as shown in Exhibits 2
and 10 to the Complaint.108

The author finds two technical errors with the holding. First, the judge
used the language “physically separable,” but, as discussed above, the
Supreme Court abrogated the “physically separable” part of the test. Going
forward, the test only inquires whether the feature is conceptually separable
(though query whether any physically separable feature is not also
conceptually separable).
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 15–16.
Triangl Grp. Ltd., 2017 WL 2829752, at *4.
Id. at *11.
Id. at *8 (emphasis added).
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Second, the court never examined in detail whether the black trim and
T-shape were sufficiently original to merit copyright protection. Perhaps
misreading the Star Athletica decision, which never determined the
originality of the cheerleading uniform designs (and even the district court
did not, as discussed above),109 the court here presumed “most of plaintiff’s
designs are copyrightable because the decorative black trim and T-shape are
physically separable and demonstrable as works of art.”110
However, as discussed above,111 just because a feature “(1) can be
perceived as a two- or three-dimensional work of art separate from the useful
article” (i.e., meets the first prong) and “(2) would qualify as a protectable
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work either on its own or in some other
medium if imagined separately from the useful article” (i.e., meets the
second prong) does not mean it is copyrightable; it only means that it is
separable.112
Further, in using only the shorthand that Triangl Group’s designs were
“demonstrable as works of art,” language that tracks closely to the first half
of the Supreme Court’s test, the court’s analysis omitted the second half of
the Supreme Court’s test.
Query, if defendants had not defaulted, could they have argued that the
works were not original? Could they have argued that the works did not meet
the threshold of originality because the designs were just “common
geometric shapes,” using the language of the Compendium III?113
Due to Triangl Group’s success on the trademark and trade dress
claims, perhaps the outcome would not change. Moreover, the court could
have heeded Justice Ginsburg’s view of the designs on the bikinis as
copyrightable two-dimensional images (not “designs of useful articles” but
rather “pictorial or graphic works reproduced on useful articles”), or found
infringement based on copying just the photographs. In any event, the court
granted a default judgment and permanent injunction.114 Finally, it is worth
noting that in the judge’s efforts to do justice and stop free riders, the judge
interpreted the Supreme Court’s test in a manner that favored plaintiffs at
least in part due to his omission of any originality analysis.

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
2017).
114.

See supra Section II(E).
Triangl Grp. Ltd., 2017 WL 2829752, at *8.
See supra Section II(B).
See Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1007 (2017).
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 906.1 (3d ed.
Triangl Grp. Ltd., 2017 WL 2829752, at *11.

76

CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

Vol 18:1

D. Jetmax Ltd. v. Big Lots, Inc.
1.

Background

In another case in the Southern District of New York, Jetmax Limited
brought suit against Big Lots, Inc. and other defendants, alleging the
defendants infringed Jetmax’s copyright in a strand of twinkle lights covered
with wire-wrapped bulb covers (the “Tear Drop Light Set”).115 The
defendants’ work (the “Advance Light Set”) also consisted of a strand of
twinkle lights covered with wire-wrapped bulb covers, though it differed in
some respects. “The Advance Light Set does not contain an ornamental
dangly and the cover does not have an iridescent finish.”116 See below.

The plaintiff’s product appears on the left and the defendants’ on the
right.117 Jetmax moved for summary judgment on its copyright
infringement claim.118 Here, the defendants challenged Jetmax in arguing
“that the Tear Drop Light Set is not copyrightable because it is a useful
article and because it lacks originality.”119 Defendants filed a cross-motion
for summary judgment.120
115. See Jetmax Ltd. v. Big Lots, Inc., No. 15-cv-9597 (KBF), 2017 WL 3726756, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 28, 2017).
116. Id. at *2.
117. Id.
118. See id. at *1.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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Judge Forrest denied both Jetmax’s motion for summary judgment and
the defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment, ruling that Jetmax’s
Tear Drop Light Set contained conceptually separable elements, though the
court reserved judgment on whether such elements were sufficiently
original.121
2. Application of Star Athletica and Conceptual Separability
Analysis
In finding that Jetmax’s Tear Drop Light Set contained conceptually
separable elements, Judge Forrest held:
Here, the parties do not dispute that the Tear Drop Light Set is a
useful article insofar as it serves the ‘intrinsic utilitarian function’ of
providing light to a room. Rather, the parties strongly disagree
regarding whether the Tear Drop Light Set contains artistic elements
that are sufficiently separable in order to merit copyright protection.
Having carefully considered this question, the Court finds that the
Tear Drop Light Set does contain artistic elements—the decorative
covers—that can be identified separately from, and are capable of
existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.122

Here, the court’s language duplicated the Supreme Court’s test from
Star Athletica almost exactly, but the court substitutes language from the
statute for part two instead of the language from the Supreme Court (in the
court’s opinion, part one, “can be perceived,” is the Supreme Court’s
language,123 while part two, “capable of existing independently,” comes
from the statute).124
While closely following the Supreme Court’s test, and also mirroring
the statute, Judge Forrest added an enhancement to the test not found in either
Star Athletica or the statute:
The decorative covers are sculptural works that are capable of
existing apart from the utilitarian aspect of the light set, i.e. the light
bulbs and other components that cause the Tear Drop Light Set to
light a room. The primary purpose of the cover is artistic; once the

121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
Id. at *4 (emphasis added).
Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1007 (2017).
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010).
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covers are removed, the remainder is a functioning but unadorned
light string.125

The Supreme Court never required that the “primary purpose” of the
conceptually separable feature be “artistic.” However, the Supreme Court’s
test does include the term “artistic” in that it calls for analyzing an “artistic
feature.”126
The author notes that Judge Forrest’s “primary purpose” test evokes but
does not replicate the “Primary-Subsidiary Approach” from KieselsteinCord,127 as the tests differ in significant respects. In Kieselstein-Cord, the
court ignored the functionality of the belt buckle as a whole and did not look
to any separable aspects. Here, Judge Forrest examined the decorative covers
as separate from the utilitarian light strand.
Where the decorative covers adorn a functional light strand that “serves
the ‘intrinsic utilitarian function’” of “providing light to a room,” she
identified the decorative covers as “capable of existing independently of” the
utilitarian light strand.128 Judge Forrest’s language meshes nicely with that
of the statute, which dictates, “[a]n article that is normally part of a useful
article is considered a ‘useful article.’”129 Here, the decorative covers are not
normally part of providing light to a room.
Further, the Supreme Court’s test holds no concern for the leftover
portion of the useful article. Judge Forrest did explicitly recognize this part
of the Supreme Court’s ruling in a footnote to her opinion:
Even if the covers reduce glare and serve some utilitarian function,
the Supreme Court explained that the imagined remainder of the
article “left behind” once the pictorial, graphical, or sculptural
element is removed need not “be a fully functioning useful article at
all, much less an equally useful one.” 130

125. Jetmax Ltd., 2017 WL 3726756, at *6 (emphasis added, footnote omitted).
126. Star Athletica, L.L.C., 137 S. Ct. at 1016 (“an artistic feature of the design of a useful article is
eligible for copyright protection if . . .”).
127. See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding
“[t]he primary ornamental aspect of” the belt buckle works at issue “conceptually separable from their
subsidiary utilitarian function”). The Sixth Circuit titled the Kieselstein-Cord test as the “PrimarySubsidiary Approach” in Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, L.L.C., 799 F.3d 468, 484 (6th Cir. 2015).
128. Jetmax Ltd., 2017 WL 3726756, at *4.
129. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010).
130. Jetmax Ltd., 2017 WL 3726756, at *6 n.2 (citation omitted).
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Though conceding that the decorative covers “serve some utilitarian
function,”131 the court nevertheless held that they “can be identified
separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian
aspects” of the useful article.132
After examining the conceptual separability issue, Judge Forrest wrote
that the Tear Drop Light likely meets the threshold of originality, but
reserved judgment on the issue of originality because she said genuine
disputes of material fact existed.133
While not strictly following the Supreme Court, Judge Forrest’s
“primary function” language provides interesting and key guidance to
creators, copyright owners, and future litigants. The test conjures a modified
version of Carol Barnhart134–the court interprets the artistic features as
separate from the utilitarian function of the overall article–but in a twist, due
to the Supreme Court’s guidance in Star Athletica, Judge Forrest’s test
recognizes that a functioning useful article need not remain after separating
the artistic features. Judge Forrest’s test in Jetmax provides that a decorative
or artistic feature of a useful article may be conceptually separable, despite
having some utilitarian function, so long as its primary function is not
utilitarian, which may be evident by a utilitarian element left behind.
E. Lego A/S v. Best-Lock Construction Toys, Inc.
1. Background
Lego filed suit in the District of Connecticut against the defendants for
copyright infringement of its figurines.135 See below.

131. Id.
132. Id. at *6 (quoting Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1007 (2017)).
133. Id. at *6. As in Star Athletica, the court ruled on the issue of conceptual separability, but not
originality. See Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1007 (2017).
134. Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding mannequins of
partial human torsos to be utilitarian articles without any separable, copyrightable features). The Sixth
Circuit titled the Carol Barnhart test the “Objectively Necessary Approach,” describing its holding as,
“[a] pictorial, graphic, or sculptural feature is conceptually separable if the artistic features of the design
are not necessary to the performance of the utilitarian function of the article.” Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star
Athletica, L.L.C., 799 F.3d 468, 484 (6th Cir. 2015).
135. See Lego A/S v. Best-Lock Constr. Toys, Inc., No. 3:11-cv-01586 (CSH), 2017 WL 6540268,
at *1 (D. Conn. Dec. 21, 2017).
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Best-Lock’s figure is on the left and Lego’s figure is on the right in each
image above.136 As of this writing, the case remains ongoing, though Judge
Haight issued an opinion in a discovery dispute that references and interprets
Star Athletica.137

136. Complaint at 3, Lego A/S v. Best-Lock Constr. Toys, Inc., No. 3:11-cv-01586 (CSH), 2017 WL
6540268 (D. Conn. Dec. 21, 2017).
137. Lego A/S, 2017 WL 6540268, at *6 n.6.
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2. Application of Star Athletica and Conceptual Separability
Analysis
The defendants moved to defer consideration of Lego’s motion for
partial summary judgment and moved to compel production of documents,
depositions, and supplemental interrogatory responses.138 In ruling on the
discovery dispute, Judge Haight recognized that the Supreme Court’s ruling
in Star Athletica means certain considerations do not apply in a conceptual
separability analysis.139
In denying defendants’ motion, Judge Haight wrote:
Best-Lock does not explain how discovery as to what Lego
considered protectable is relevant to Lego’s motion for summary
judgment on the copyright infringement claim. Indeed, Best-Lock’s
position appears contrary to that expressed recently in Star Athletica,
L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1015 (2017), where
the Supreme Court noted that in determining whether the design of a
useful article is eligible for copyright, the “inquiry is limited to how
the article and feature are perceived, not how or why they were
designed.” (citing Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co.,
834 F.2d 1142, 1152 (2d Cir. 1982)). Thus, Lego’s argument that the
“scope” of the copyrights would be determined by the registrations
and deposit materials, already in the record, is well founded. BestLock offers nothing persuasive to the contrary. 140

As in Star Athletica, artistic motivation does not influence
copyrightability. How or why Lego designed its works does not matter.
Going even further, Judge Haight held that what the plaintiff considered
protectable does not matter.141 The court can decide what is protectable.142
Judge Haight’s opinion differs somewhat from the Inhale case, where
the judge there examined how the plaintiff claimed copyright in the hookah
water container as a whole and the judge criticized the plaintiff for not
identifying what features it considered conceptually separable from the work
as a whole.143 Lego claimed the “copyrighted Minifigure comprises, in whole
or in part, wholly original works of authorship that are copyrightable subject

138. Id. at *2.
139. See id. at *6 n.6; see also supra Section II(D).
140. Lego A/S, 2017 WL 6540268, at *6 n.6.
141. See id. at *6.
142. See id. at *7 n.7.
143. Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-03838-ODW (FFM), 2017 WL 4163990, at
*3 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2017).
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matter” and that the defendant’s work “is strikingly and substantially similar
to the Minifigure Copyrights.”144 In other words, Lego did not claim the
defendant infringed any particular subset of the figurine, though it noted the
torso, head, arms, legs, and feet of the allegedly infringing figurine featured
the same dimensions as the Minifigure, in essence claiming copyright in the
whole and all of the parts.145
Interestingly, Judge Haight is not new to the conceptual separability
analysis. Judge Haight served as the district court judge in the Brandir case,
where the Second Circuit affirmed his opinion on the non-copyrightability
of the bicycle rack (though the Second Circuit reversed his opinion on the
trademark claim in that case). As shown above, Judge Haight even cited the
Supreme Court’s citation of the Brandir case, specifically, the Second
Circuit’s affirmance of his opinion.
F. Silvertop Associates, Inc. v. Kangaroo Manufacturing, Inc.
1. Background
Silvertop Associates, Inc. d/b/a Rasta Imposta filed suit in the District
of New Jersey against defendant Kangaroo Manufacturing, Inc. for copyright
infringement of its banana costume, among other causes of action.146 See
below.

144. Complaint at 2–4, Lego A/S v. Best-Lock Constr. Toys, Inc., No. 3:11-cv-01586 (CSH), 2017
WL 6540268 (D. Conn. Dec. 21, 2017).
145. Id. The author notes that toys, when they are not mere copies of a useful article, may be
considered sculptural works. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE
PRACTICES §§ 313.4(A), 503.1(B) (3d ed. revised Sept. 29, 2017). However, it may be an open question
whether portions of a toy that fit together with other pieces might be considered useful.
146. Silvertop Assocs., Inc. v. Kangaroo Mfg., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 3d 754, 760 (D.N.J. 2018).
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The plaintiff’s work appears at left and the center and right images show
the defendant’s works.147 By way of background, the court notes that the
founder of Kangaroo previously worked for a company that had a business
relationship with Rasta Imposta to sell Rasta Imposta’s banana costume. 148
Rasta Imposta filed a motion for preliminary injunction.149
2. Application of Star Athletica and Conceptual Separability
Analysis
The court noted that it was the first in the Third Circuit to interpret the
Supreme Court’s Star Athletica ruling.150 As a preliminary matter, the court
briefly described how costumes, including the costume at issue, are useful
articles not generally protectable by copyright.151 However, as the court
recognized, certain features of costumes can be protectable.152 The court
quoted the Star Athletica two-part test.153
Turning to the banana costume at issue, the court acknowledged Rasta
Imposta’s claims of certain “unique features of the banana design” as
copyrightable: “the overall shape and cutout holes of the costume, the black
ends of the banana, and the vertical lines running down the middle of the
banana.”154 The court held that the costume’s armholes were not protectable,
as they “perform a solely utilitarian function” of allowing a person to wear
the costume.155
Then, the court discussed how it found other features of the costume,
taken as a whole and not dissecting into individual components, protectable
under copyright law.156 Quoting a Third Circuit decision involving sculptural
works resembling rocks or stones inscribed with a verse, Judge Hillman
identified “the combination of texture, color, size and shape” as relevant.157
Unlike the armholes, Judge Hillman found that “the other features of the

147. Complaint at 2, Silvertop Assocs., Inc. v. Kangaroo Mfg., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 3d 754 (D.N.J.
2018).
148. Silvertop Assocs., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 3d at 760.
149. Id. at 759.
150. Id. at 762 n.4.
151. Id. at 762 (quoting Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Indus., 912 F.2d 663, 670–71 (3d. Cir.
1990) (“[A] costume . . . may serve, aside from its appearance, to clothe the wearer . . . .”)).
152. See id. at 763.
153. Id. at 762–63.
154. Id. at 763.
155. Id. at 764.
156. Id. at 764–65.
157. Id. at 764 (quoting Kay Berry, Inc. v. Taylor Gifts, Inc., 421 F.3d 199, 207 (3d Cir. 2005)). The
Kay Berry decision contains no discussion of useful articles.
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Banana Costume can be identified separately from and are capable of
existing independently of the utilitarian aspects.”158
The court found Rasta Imposta’s registration certificate persuasive, and
further, the court stated it “can easily identify the features of the Banana
Costume having a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural quality.”159 The court
listed the numerous features:
a) the overall length of the costume, b) the overall shape of the design
in terms of curvature, c) the length of the shape both above and below
the torso of the wearer, d) the shape, size, and jet black color of both
ends, e) the location of the head and arm cutouts which dictate how
the costume drapes on and protrudes from a wearer (as opposed to
the mere existence of the cutout holes), f) the soft, smooth, almost
shiny look and feel of the chosen synthetic fabric, g) the parallel lines
which mimic the ridges on a banana in three-dimensional form, and
h) the bright shade of a golden yellow and uniform color that appears
distinct from the more muted and inconsistent tones of a natural
banana.160

Judge Hillman held that “if these features were separated from the
costume itself and applied on a painter’s canvas, it would qualify as a twodimensional work of art in a way that would not replicate the costume
itself.”161 Query whether nearly anything applied on a painter’s canvas might
become a “work of art.”
Next, the court discussed the merger and scènes à faire doctrines.162 The
court found merger did not apply because Rasta Imposter provided twentyone examples of banana costumes available in the marketplace “that are
easily distinguished from Rasta Imposta’s design . . . .”163 The court listed
numerous ways that banana costumes might differ in appearance.164
As for scènes à faire, the court implied there is no such thing as scènes
à faire with regard to banana costumes because there is no commonly
recognized expression of a banana costume “genre.”165 In contrast, the court

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 764.
Id.
Id. at 764–65.
Id. at 765.
Id. at 766–68, 768 n.11.
Id. at 768.
Id.
See id. at 765 n.6, 768 n.11.
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implies the existence of a public consensus of what an American
cheerleading costume looks like.166
While acknowledging Rasta Imposta’s relatively limited scope of
rights, the court granted the preliminary injunction due to Rasta Imposta’s
“reasonable likelihood of providing ‘near identity’ of the costumes and that
the copyright relates to protectable material.”167
The defendant filed an appeal to the Third Circuit on June 11, 2018,
which is still pending as of this writing.168
The author submits that the appeal should address, at least, what or
whether any “left behind” parts remain after separability. As currently
envisioned by Judge Hillman, it appears that the only utilitarian features of
the costume are the armholes.169 Yet the armholes, being holes, are not a
physical part of the costume but merely an absence of fabric or essentially
negative space. The author finds it difficult to consider negative space as a
“left behind” part of a utilitarian object.
Without any left behind parts, the Third Circuit should find the entire
costume functional as a whole. In Star Athletica, the Supreme Court held
that designs on the cheerleading uniform were separable from the underlying
uniform.170 The author posits that it is difficult to see how the Third Circuit
could affirm the district court’s holding using the district court’s reasoning,
as the costume’s features Judge Hillman identified (color, shape, parallel
lines, texture and appearance of the fabric) constitute the entire costume and
accordingly are not separable from any underlying utilitarian object.
However, if the Third Circuit would identify a more limited set of separable,
copyrightable features, then the Third Circuit could potentially affirm the
holding under different reasoning.
A prior version of the Compendium III, describing registration
standards of the Copyright Office, precluded registration of costumes
without “two- or three-dimensional design elements that are separable from
the costume itself . . . .”171 The prior version of the Compendium III advised:
166. Id. at 765 n.6 (describing “the iconic outfit of an American cheerleader”); but see Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc.,
137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017) (No. 15-866), 2016 WL 5116853 (discussing “decorations evocative of
cheerleading are not immutable, but have evolved over time” and reproducing the Norman Rockwell
image Cheerleaders from 1952, showing three cheerleaders in outfits quite different from those produced
by Star Athletica and Varsity Brands).
167. Silvertop Assocs., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 3d at 768.
168. Appeal of Petitioner-Appellant, Silvertop Assocs., Inc. v. Kangaroo Mfg., Inc., No. 18-2266 (3d
Cir. June 11, 2018).
169. See Silvertop Assocs., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 3d at 764.
170. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1012 (2017).
171. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 924.3(B) (3d
ed. revised Dec. 22, 2014).

86

CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

Vol 18:1

[t]he fact that a costume may be intended primarily for ornamentation
and show, and secondarily for covering the body, does not change
the fact that a costume is a useful article. Whole- or partial-body
costumes are considered useful articles and are subject to the
separability test, even if they depict a person or thing, or illustrate
cultural, historical, or occupational garb or dress. 172

However, the present version of the Compendium III no longer contains
the above guidance, including only a reproduction of the Star Athletica test
along with a note that the Copyright Office is developing updated guidance
and will update the Compendium when it finalizes its guidance.173
While numerous other cases pre-Star Athletica addressed the
copyrightability of costumes, the author leaves aside further discussion of
the copyrightability of costumes or aspects of costumes, awaiting word from
the Copyright Office on Compendium III revisions and from the Third
Circuit on the banana costume a-peel.
G. Ross v. Apple, Inc.
1. Background
Pro se plaintiff Thomas S. Ross filed suit in the Southern District of
Florida against Apple, Inc., alleging copyright infringement of his plans for
an electronic reading device.174 See below.

172. Id. § 924.3(A)(2).
173. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 924 (3d ed.
revised Sept. 29, 2017). Interestingly, the same section now omits a blanket rule that the Copyright Office
considers clothing uncopyrightable, though Section 311.1 of the current version of the Compendium III
still references the Copyright Office’s policy against registering copyright protection in clothing. See also
Registrability of Costume Designs, 56 Fed. Reg. 56,530, 56,531 (Nov. 5, 1991).
174. Complaint at 1, Ross v. Apple, Inc., No. 16-61471-CIV-WILLIAMS, 2016 WL 8808769 (S.D.
Fla. Dec. 30, 2016).
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Ross’s drawing appears at left and an image of an Apple iPhone device
appears at right.175 Ross alleged that he created the above drawing and other
similar plans for devices in 1992 and registered protection in the drawings in
2014.176 Some of his other copyright applications in suit refer to dual-screen
devices that appear to open like a book.177 Ross “contended that Apple had
systematically searched for abandoned and discarded ideas to patent and
exploit,”178 and that Apple’s various products “were substantially similar to
his drawings of the Device and embodied its ‘non-functional aesthetic look
and feel.’”179 In the complaint, Ross included multiple reproductions of a
quote attributed to the former chief executive officer of Apple, Steve Jobs,
“Good artists copy, great artists steal. We have always been shameless about
stealing great ideas.”180
After the district court dismissed Ross’s claims and denied leave to
amend his complaint,181 Ross appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, which issued
a per curiam opinion falling within the author’s examined time frame,

175. Id. at 21.
176. Id. at 2.
177. See id. at 9–10.
178. Ross v. Apple, Inc., No. 17-13712, 2018 WL 3409988, at *1 (11th Cir. July 12, 2018), cert.
denied, No. 18-494, 2018 WL 5044841 (U.S. Dec. 3, 2018) (mem.).
179. Id., quoting Complaint at 12, Ross v. Apple, Inc., No. 16-61471-CIV-WILLIAMS, 2016 WL
8808769, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 2016).
180. Complaint at Exhibit D.6, Ross v. Apple, Inc., No. 16-61471-CIV-WILLIAMS, 2016 WL
8808769 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 2016).
181. Ross v. Apple, Inc., No. 16-61471-CIV-WILLIAMS, 2016 WL 8808769, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Dec.
30, 2016).
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affirming the lower court’s dismissal of Ross’s claims and briefly discussing
the conceptual separability analysis.182
2. Analysis of Star Athletica and Conceptual Separability
As a preliminary matter, the author submits this case adds little to the
discourse on Star Athletica given (1) the plaintiff’s lack of presenting much
direct comparison between specific works and due to his alleging general
infringement of his ideas and (2) the court’s mistaken application of the
conceptual separability analysis. On the first point, it is well-established that
copyright cannot protect ideas.183 In rejecting Ross’s claims, the Eleventh
Circuit wrote:
The idea for the Device was not subject to copyright protection; each
element of the drawing that he identified was purely functional and
inseparable from the idea of a handheld electronic reading device.
None of those elements can be conceived as a work of art separate
from the Device itself but are necessary parts of it. 184

However, Apple owns design patents on some aesthetic features of its
devices, which demonstrates that electronic devices like Apple’s may have
non-functional features (as design patents cannot protect utilitarian features
any more than copyright law can).185 It is just that such aesthetic features,
even if separable, may not be sufficiently original to merit copyright
protection.186 Here, the court held no features were even conceptually
separable.187
Further, the Supreme Court’s test does not require examining whether
any elements of a work “are necessary parts of it,”188 as the Eleventh Circuit
here wrote, but rather whether any features “(1) can be perceived as a twoor three-dimensional work of art separate from the useful article and (2)
would qualify as a protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work either on

182. Ross, 2018 WL 3409988, at *1.
183. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any idea. . . .”).
184. Ross, 2018 WL 3409988, at *3.
185. See Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 678 F.3d 1314, 1317-18 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Further
discussion of design patents falls outside the scope of this article.
186. See UR5, CORB Decision at 1 (Oct. 23, 2017) and discussion infra at Section IV(C)(2).
187. Ross, 2018 WL 3409988, at *3.
188. Id.
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its own or in some other medium if imagined separately from the useful
article.”189
Finally, the author submits that this case is another that falls through the
trap door Justice Ginsburg identified–the court need not have addressed
conceptual separability at all in this case. Similar to how in Star Athletica
the cheerleader outfit designs were two-dimensional works “reproduced on
useful articles” not “designs of useful articles,”190 here, the author posits that
Ross’s works constituted drawings of useful articles, not useful articles
themselves.
Query whether drawings can ever be useful articles. To examine the
question and the importance of Justice Ginsburg’s distinction in this case,
and in other cases discussed infra,191 the author invites the reader to refer to
the statute’s definition of “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works”:
“Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” include two-dimensional
and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art,
photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts,
diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including architectural
plans. Such works shall include works of artistic craftsmanship
insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects
are concerned; the design of a useful article, as defined in this section,
shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if,
and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from,
and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects
of the article.192

While the definition of PGS works contemplates that a work separated
from a useful article may be a PGS work, the author submits that a useful
article may not be two-dimensional. The statute defines a useful article as
“an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray
the appearance of the article or to convey information. An article that is
normally a part of a useful article is considered a ‘useful article.’”193
The author submits that a drawing of a useful article has no intrinsic
utilitarian function aside from portraying the appearance of the article or
189. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1016 (2017).
190. Id. at 1018 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
191. See Glass Egg Dig. Media v. Gameloft, Inc., No. 17-cv-04165-MMC, 2018 WL 3659259 at *1
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2018); see also infra Section III(H); Arlon FESPA/ISA 2014 Trade Show, CORB
Decision at 1 (Dec. 14, 2017); see also infra Section IV(C)(3).
192. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010).
193. Id.
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conveying information. It follows that a drawing of a useful article is not
itself a useful article, but only a drawing potentially eligible for copyright
protection as a pictorial or graphic work. As in Star Athletica, “[b]ecause the
owner of a copyright in a pre-existing PGS work may exclude a would-be
infringer from reproducing that work on a useful article, there is no need to
engage in any separability inquiry to resolve” the case.194
Accordingly, the court in Ross need only have examined whether
Apple’s devices or two-dimensional depictions of its devices infringed
Ross’s copyright rights in his drawings, to the extent the court found that
Ross sufficiently stated a claim.
H. Glass Egg Digital Media v. Gameloft, Inc.
1. Background
As with the Ross case above, the author submits that Glass Egg Digital
Media v. Gameloft, Inc. adds little to the discourse on Star Athletica.
However, due to the Northern District of California’s citation of Star
Athletica in its brief mention of separability,195 this case meets the author’s
criteria for inclusion in this article.
Glass Egg Digital Media (“Glass Egg”) filed suit in the Northern
District of California against the defendants, alleging copyright infringement
of three-dimensional digital car models for use in a series of video games
under the name Asphalt.196 Glass Egg did not include any images of the
digital car models at issue in its complaint or any other filings before the
court.
Essentially, Glass Egg alleged that its employees moonlighted for
defendants to create the digital car models, using Glass Egg’s resources, and
so Glass Egg claimed copyright ownership of the works under the work made
for hire doctrine.197 However, Judge Chesney held that Vietnamese copyright
law applied as to ownership of the works because the works were created by
Vietnamese nationals in Vietnam (i.e., the Glass Egg employees). 198
Vietnamese copyright law evidently differs from U.S. copyright law at least
with regard to the work made for hire doctrine. Under Vietnamese law, “[a]n

194. Star Athletica L.L.C., 137 S. Ct. at 1018 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
195. Glass Egg Dig. Media v. Gameloft, Inc., No. 17-cv-04165-MMC, 2018 WL 3659259, at *5
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2018).
196. Complaint at 1, Glass Egg Dig. Media v. Gameloft, Inc., No. 17-cv-04165-MMC, 2018 WL
3659259 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2018).
197. Glass Egg Dig. Media, 2018 WL 3659259, at *2.
198. Id. at *3.
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organization that assigns a duty of creating a work to an author, who is its
employee, shall be the owner of the [work].”199
Here, because Glass Egg did not assign the duty to its employees, and
rather alleged that its employees “clandestinely” created the works for
defendants, Judge Chesney held that Glass Egg did not own the works as
works made for hire.200
As to Glass Egg’s conclusory statement that it also owned the works
via written agreements, Judge Chesney held the pleading deficient, as
Vietnamese law requires certain specified terms for a copyright assignment
to be effective, and Glass Egg did not allege the requisite contractual
terms.201 However, Judge Chesney allowed leave to amend.202
Considering the possibility that Glass Egg might cure the deficient
pleading, Judge Chesney continued her analysis on the infringement issue.203
The parties and the judge agreed United States law governed the scope of
protection and therefore infringement.204 Glass Egg alleged infringement of
two categories of works, “polygon arrangements” and “special effects.”205
Judge Chesney essentially dismissed the infringement of special effects
claim as speculative, particularly in light of Glass Egg’s failure to include
any images of the special effects and their use in the Asphalt games.206
2. Discussion of Star Athletica and Conceptual Separability
As for the polygon arrangements, Glass Egg contended that they met
the copyright law’s originality requirement and, citing Star Athletica, that
they “can be separated from the shape and appearance of the cars.”207 Judge
Chesney held that Glass Egg sufficiently alleged the polygon arrangements
constituting cars were sufficiently original, “[a]ssuming the polygon
arrangements can be separated from the shape and appearance of the cars . .
. .”208
Glass Egg and Judge Chesney appear to have misapplied the Star
Athletica language in an attempt to distinguish the present case from

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *4–6.
Id. at *5–6.
See id. at *4 (citing Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017)).
Glass Egg Dig. Media, 2018 WL 3659259, at *5.
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Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc.209 The Tenth Circuit in
Meshwerks held that digital computer model replicas of Toyota cars, which
“were two-dimensional wire-frame depictions of Toyota’s vehicles that
appeared three-dimensional on screen,” were not sufficiently original
because they did not depict any original expression like lighting, shading, or
background.210 The Tenth Circuit in Meshwerks made no mention of
conceptual separability and did not describe the computer models as useful
articles.211
Query whether computer models can be useful articles. As with the twodimensional drawings in Ross, the author submits that the two-dimensional
digital renderings of the cars in Glass Egg Digital Media did not constitute
useful objects per se. The fact that the digital models appear to be threedimensional on-screen does not change them from drawings into useful
articles. The drawings have no intrinsic utilitarian function aside from
portraying the appearance of the article or conveying information.212
Therefore, the author posits that the court erred in citing Glass Egg’s
brief arguing that the polygon arrangements “can be separated from the
shapes and appearance of the cars” because computer models are not useful
articles. They are drawings of useful articles, which the author submits lend
themselves more to an originality analysis (as in Meshwerks) and not a
conceptual separately analysis.
IV. COPYRIGHT OFFICE REVIEW BOARD DECISIONS AFTER
STAR ATHLETICA
A. Overview and Background
1. Procedure and Standards of the Copyright Office Review Board
The CORB reviews second requests for reconsideration of rejected
copyright applications.213 In other words, copyright claimants reach the
CORB as a third stop in the application process.
First, procedurally, a copyright claimant files an application to register
copyright in a work or collection of works. A Registration Specialist will
examine and may reject the application. If rejected, the claimant may file an
appeal, otherwise known as a request for reconsideration, following the
209. Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 2008).
210. Id. at 1261, 1265–66 (analogizing to copyrightable aspects of matter contained in photographs).
211. See id.
212. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010) (defining “useful article”).
213. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 1704.2 (3d
ed. 2017).
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proper format.214 An Attorney-Advisor at the Copyright Office reviews the
first appeal de novo.215 If the Attorney-Advisor maintains the Registration
Specialist’s rejection of the claimant’s application, the claimant may file a
second request for reconsideration, following the proper format.216 The
CORB refers to the initial examination by the Registration Specialist and the
first appeal as the “Registration Program.”217 The CORB reviews second
requests for reconsideration de novo.218
If applicants wish to review CORB rejections, they may do so in federal
court.219 A federal court may review the CORB’s decision under the
Administrative Procedure Act, determining whether it holds such decision to
be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.”220
Commentators note the Copyright Office typically treats applications
more harshly in its originality analyses as compared to courts.221
Accordingly, the below CORB decisions contrast with the federal court
decisions above in certain respects. For example, the CORB decisions
typically feature analysis of originality, whereas courts may rule on
separability without reaching the issue of originality.222
2. Methodology of Decisions Reviewed
The Copyright Office publishes decisions of the CORB on its
website.223 To obtain the relevant results for this article, the author searched
for decisions on the Copyright Office’s website, using the checkbox feature
to limit results to those involving the category “useful article.” Next, the
author reviewed only those decisions dated between March 22, 2017 and
mid-October 2018 to examine those issued in the first eighteen months postStar Athletica. The search revealed the following eight decisions. In these
214. 37 C.F.R. § 202.5(b)(1) (2017); COMPENDIUM (THIRD) § 1703.1.
215. COMPENDIUM (THIRD) § 1703.2.
216. 37 C.F.R. § 1704.1; COMPENDIUM (THIRD) § 1704.1.
217. See COMPENDIUM (THIRD) § 1704.1.
218. Id. § 1704.2.
219. 5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq.(2000); 37 C.F.R. § 202.5(c)(4) (2017); COMPENDIUM (THIRD) § 1706.
220. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
221. See, e.g., Roberta Horton, The Threshold of Copyright Protection After American Airlines,
LAW360 (Feb. 26, 2018, 2:17 PM) https://www.law360.com/articles/1013278/the-threshold-ofcopyright-protection-after-american-airlines (“In our view, the courts have adopted more liberal
standards for evaluating creativity than has the Copyright Office, reflecting a tension between the
agency’s determinations and the courts’ more reasonable interpretations of ‘creativity.’”).
222. See, e.g., Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1007 (2017); see also
Section III supra.
223. REVIEW BOARD LETTERS ONLINE, https://www.copyright.gov/rulings-filings/review-board/
(last visited Jan. 11, 2019).
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eight decisions, the CORB reversed five refusals and affirmed three refusals
of copyright applications.
B. Refusals Reversed in the First Eighteen Months After Star
Athletica
1. Trilliane Strand
The present case and the following case involve Swarovski Lighting’s
copyright applications for fixtures comprised of a light fixture with
decorative crystal details. In Trilliane Strand, the CORB reversed the
Registration Program’s refusal to register the crystal crown and a curtain of
crystals on a lighting feature, determining the crystal crown and curtain of
crystals constitute an artistic feature separable from the overall light fixture,
which constituted a useful article.224 See below.225

Swarovski, for its part, did “not claim copyright in the overall shape or
industrial design of the Trillane Strand,” as it excluded “the internal wiring,
224. Trillane Strand, CORB Decision at 3 (July 27, 2017).
225. Id. at 2.
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ceiling mounting mechanism, [and] lighting component or light bulbs,” and
it did claim copyright in the “artistic expression reflected in the sculptural
features of the work.”226 Accordingly, the CORB reversed the Registration
Program’s refusal to register the crystal crown and curtain of crystal strands,
finding the three-dimensional features “can be perceived as a freestanding
work of art that does not recreate the light fixture when imaginatively
removed from the useful article” and finding the work sufficiently original
under Feist.227
2. Amaca
As in Trillane Strand, the CORB in Amaca reversed the Registration
Program’s refusal to register Swarovski’s crystal mesh hammocks on a
lighting feature, determining the crystal mesh hammocks adorning a lighting
fixture constituted an artistic feature separable from the overall lighting
fixture, which the CORB determined was a useful article.228 See below.229

226. Trillane Strand, CORB Decision at 2; Letter from Shanna Sanders, Rothenberg Farley & Mesiti
P.C. to U.S. Copyright Office at 2 (Mar. 9, 2016); Letter from Shanna Sanders, Rothenberg Farley &
Mesiti P.C. to U.S. Copyright Office at 3 (Oct. 6, 2016) (emphasis in original).
227. Trillane Strand, CORB Decision at 3; see also Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Servs. Co., 499
U.S. 340, 363 (1991).
228. Amaca, CORB Decision at 2 (July 27, 2017).
229. Id. at 1.
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Swarovski sought only to protect the separable “crystal mesh
hammocks” on the lighting fixture.230 The CORB found such features “can
be perceived as a freestanding work of art that does not recreate the light
fixture when imaginatively removed from the useful article” and found the
work sufficiently original under Feist.231
3. Wanderer
In Wanderer, the CORB reversed the Registration Program’s refusal to
register a complex placement of lace patternwork on a kimono, determining
that such lacework can be identified as a two-dimensional work of art
separate from the kimono.232
Specifically, the design consisted of “the placement of vertical strips of
lace, ‘the use of three different flower designs,’ ‘the arrangement of one row
of one flower design, followed by six rows of another flower design, all
interspersed with a third, smaller flower design,’ and ‘the inconsistency in
the shape of the bottom trim of the kimono.’”233
The CORB noted the applicant “Sisco does not seek copyright
protection for the overall kimono . . . .”234 In contrast, consider the owner of
the copyright registration for the hookah water container, Inhale, which
failed to identify any particular aspect of its work and instead claimed
copyright in the work as a whole.235 However, it is well established that
clothing is a useful article.236 Therefore, it follows that copyright can only
protect separable elements and not the clothing item as a whole.
The CORB held that the “relatively complex placement of lace
patternwork can be identified as a two-dimensional work of art separate from
the kimono; it is thus separable.”237 Then, the CORB cited to Star Athletica
in further noting that the separable features “do not recreate the kimono when

230. Id.
231. Id.; see also Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 363.
232. Wanderer, CORB Decision at 1 (Nov. 28, 2017).
233. Id. (quoting Letter from Andrew Simpson, Knobbe, Martens, Olson & Bear LLP, to U.S.
Copyright Office at 3 (July 25, 2016) accord Letter from Juliana M. Simon, Knobbe, Martens, Olson &
Bear, LLP, to U.S. Copyright Office at 2–3 (May 2, 2017)). Note the decision did not include a picture
of the work.
234. Wanderer, CORB Decision at 1.
235. Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-03838-ODW (FFM), 2017 WL 4163990, at
*3 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2017).
236. See Registrability of Costume Designs, 56 Fed. Reg. 56,530, 56,531 (Nov. 5, 1991); U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 311.1 (3d ed. 2017); see
also 11 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 924.3(A) (2018). But see
supra Section III(F).
237. Wanderer, CORB Decision at 2.
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so imaginatively removed,”238 and as in Star Athletica, “imaginatively
removing the surface decorations from the uniforms and applying them in
another medium would not replicate the uniform itself.”239
After analyzing the separability issue, the CORB addressed originality.
The CORB clarified that the individual elements in the lacework, such as
flowers and honeycomb patterns, “are preexisting elements not individually
protectable under copyright law” and are “standard elements.”240
Accordingly, the CORB held that the combination of features in the work
merited thin protection.241
4. Pendant Lamp – 76
In Pendant Lamp – 76, the CORB reversed the Registration Program’s
refusal to register a glass, bisected globe lamp with two imbedded filaments
as a sculptural work.242 The lamp housed an LED bulb that the CORB
deemed utilitarian.243 See below.244

238. Id.
239. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1012 (2017).
240. Wanderer, CORB Decision at 2.
241. Id. See also Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing that “thin” copyright
protection protects against only virtually identical copying).
242. Pendant Lamp – 76, CORB Decision at 2–3 (Apr. 4, 2018).
243. Id. at 3.
244. Id. at 1-2.
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The applicant could not convince the Registration Program in its initial
appeal letters that the rest of the lamp contained separable authorship. The
CORB noted that “the second rejection letter pre-dated the Supreme Court’s
Star Athletica decision by three weeks.”245 In analyzing the work, even
though the CORB reversed the Registration Program’s determination, the
CORB emphasized that “[t]he Star Athletica decision did not change the fact
that copyright law does not protect useful articles as such,” but stated the
Supreme Court’s decision “clarifies” the test.246 The CORB then reproduced
the two-part test in its entirety.247
Applying the test, the CORB found the “glass sculpture and imbedded
filaments meet the test” and “the Work’s three-dimensional design of glass
formed into a half globe and imbedded with filament wires can be perceived
as a standalone work of art without the internally mounted LED that makes
the Work a useful article.”248 Then, “significantly,” the CORB found the
separable elements sufficiently original to merit copyright protection.249
The author agrees with the CORB’s decision except with regard to the
filaments, where the author submits that the CORB should have obtained
additional information from the applicant. The CORB noted that the
“internally-mounted LED is included to illuminate the globe and
filaments,”250 which presents the query whether the filaments themselves
light up along with the LED bulb, such as with fiber optic cables.
If the filaments do light up, are they useful, or decorative? The court in
Jetmax held the string lights were functional, aside from the decorative
covers, because they provide light to a room.251 But, fiber optic cables only
light up if a light shines through them. Accordingly, the author submits that
the better view is that the filaments, if like the fiber optic kind, are more like
the potentially protectable decorative covers than the unprotectable light
bulb, and should not be considered functional.
However, if the filaments do not light up but simply constitute exposed
wiring to power and light the LED bulb, the CORB should have considered
the wiring functional and ineligible for copyright protection, as the wiring
provides the utilitarian function of delivering electricity to the LED bulb.

245. Id. at 2.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 2–3.
248. Id. at 3.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 1.
251. Jetmax Ltd. v. Big Lots, Inc., Case No. 15-cv-9597 (KBF), 2017 WL 3726756, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 28, 2017).
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Therefore, the author submits that the CORB should have requested
additional information from the applicant about the filaments.
5. Floor Liner
In Floor Liner, the CORB reversed the Registration Program’s refusal
to register a black floor liner shaped to fit the floor of a vehicle as a sculptural
work.252 The CORB described the floor liner as a quadrilateral with a top
surface as “embossed with a pattern of various raised, non-standard
geometric shapes.”253 See below.254

The applicant did not seek copyright protection for “the overall floor
liner,” which it acknowledged as a useful article, but rather sought to register
the “decorative raised pattern comprising various shapes and orientations,”
which it asserted served no useful function.255 The CORB seemed to consider
quite important and took pains to emphasize that, in making its decision, it

252.
253.
254.
255.

Floor Liner, CORB Decision at 2–3 (Apr. 19, 2018).
Id. at 1.
Id. at 2.
Id.
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took the applicant at its word that the particular pattern served no useful
function.256
Confusingly, although the applicant applied to register a sculptural (i.e.,
three-dimensional) claim in the work, the CORB applied the Star Athletica
test and declared that “the Work’s raised, decorative pattern of various
shapes can be identified as a two-dimensional work of art separate from the
floor liner.”257 Further, the CORB found the design sufficiently original as
to merit copyright protection.258
Query what it means for the applicant’s registration that the CORB
found only the raised, decorative pattern separable as a two-dimensional
work of art. Did the CORB mean three-dimensional? Does the work become
registered as a two-dimensional work or a three-dimensional sculptural
work? The author’s search on the Copyright Office website yielded a
registration record VA0002101719 for a work of the visual arts titled “Floor
Liner” and having the copyright claimant Quadratec, Inc., the same entity
appealing the rejection here.259 While it appears to the author that the CORB
transformed the applicant’s sculptural claim into a claim for solely the twodimensional pattern, it also appears to the author that the Registration Policy
and Practice division registered three-dimensional sculptural features of the
work, if the registration record refers to the same work. The Copyright
Office’s notes in the registration record state, “Basis for Registration:
Sculptural features identified separately from and capable of existing
independently of the utilitarian aspects of a useful article.”260
On the one hand, the applicant acknowledged that “grooves and lines
on the surface of a floor liner, in general, do serve the useful function of
trapping dirt and water,”261 and yet on the other hand, the CORB found that
the particular pattern here served no useful purpose.262 Query whether the
three-dimensional grooves serve a useful function but the two-dimensional
pattern does not.

256. Id. at 3 (“On the basis of Quadratec’s representation that this pattern serves a purely aesthetic
purpose, the Board concludes that the decorative pattern is a separable, non-useful work.”).
257. Id. (emphasis added).
258. Id.
259. Copyright Office Public Catalog, https://cocatalog.loc.gov/ (search for “Floor Liner” as Title)
(last visited Jan. 11, 2019).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 2.
262. See Floor Liner, CORB Decision at 3.
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C. Refusals Affirmed in the First Eighteen Months After Star
Athletica
1. Pizza Slice Pool Float
In Pizza Slice Pool Float, the CORB affirmed the Registration
Program’s refusal to register a two-dimensional design of a slice of
pepperoni pizza on a three-dimensional inflatable pool float as not
sufficiently original.263 See below.264

The applicant initially applied for the Pizza Slice Pool Float as a
sculptural work, noting the raised crust in the float and divots across the float
itself, but in the course of prosecution, appears to have amended its claims
to simply the two-dimensional design itself.265 While not specifically holding
that the pizza design was separable from the three-dimensional utilitarian
pool float, the CORB focused on the originality analysis, holding, “[t]he
level of creative authorship involved in its configuration of elements is, at
best, de minimis, and too trivial to enable copyright registration.”266
The CORB acknowledged that the Copyright Office and the courts have
considered combinations of simple shapes, “when combined in a distinctive
manner indicating some ingenuity,” to be protectable.267 Still, in this case,
the CORB found the work “a very common version” of a pepperoni pizza
slice, and as such, the work was not original, noting further, “the fact that

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

Pizza Slice Pool Float, CORB Decision at 1 (July 11, 2017).
Id. at 2.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 8.
Id. (quoting Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
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BigMouth had many stylistic choices and design alternatives open to it does
not factor into the calculus of originality.”268
However, the author queries whether a federal court would have
allowed the separable two-dimensional pizza design to receive “thin”
protection; the author posits that the Copyright Office should have allowed
“thin slice” protection, though perhaps not “deep dish” protection.269
2. UR5
In UR5, the CORB affirmed the Registration Program’s refusal to
register a robotic arm as a sculptural work, determining the arm did not
contain any separable, copyrightable features that contain the requisite
originality.270 The robotic arm consisted of two metal tubes with blue plastic
caps at the joints. The joints featured the Universal Robots logo. See an
image of the arm below.271

Universal Robots offered, among other arguments, that it was inspired
by the Danish Modern artistic movement. In contrast to some courts, the
CORB reiterated, “[t]he attractiveness of a design, the espoused intentions

268. Pizza Slice Pool Float, CORB Decision at 6. See also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM
OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 310.8 (3d ed. 2017) (discussing design alternatives). But see
COMPENDIUM (THIRD) § 313.3(B) (discussing the merger doctrine, which prohibits protecting expression
that “would effectively accord protection to the idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery itself”). Generally, design alternatives appear relevant for the
infringement analysis as related to merger, but not for the copyrightability analysis. 4 MELVILLE B.
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03(B)(3) (2018) (discussing the merger
doctrine; Nimmer and many courts take the view that the merger doctrine applies as a defense to
infringement rather than as part of the copyrightability analysis).
269. See Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing that “thin” copyright
protection protects against only virtually identical copying).
270. UR5, CORB Decision at 1 (Oct. 23, 2017).
271. Id.
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of the author, the design’s visual effect or its symbolism, the time and effort
it took to create, or the design’s commercial success in the marketplace are
not factors in determining whether a design is copyrightable.”272 Such
language mirrors guidance from Star Athletica and its list of do’s and
don’ts.273
The CORB expressed doubts that the plastic caps and T-shaped piece
“could be visualized as works of authorship separate and independent from
the Work’s utility.”274 In other words, the caps themselves were functional.
In addition, the CORB stated that even if the CORB considered the plastic
caps and T-shaped piece artistic and separable, they were not sufficiently
original.275 The caps themselves consisted of simple shapes and the logo on
the caps consisted of simple shapes and letters.276
The Copyright Office’s refusal to register many designs based on its
considering simple shapes not copyrightable has wide-reaching
repercussions for copyright claimants’ ability to prevent unauthorized
copying. This case demonstrates the important interplay between the
conceptual separability analysis and the originality analysis.
3. Arlon FESPA/ISA 2014 Trade Show
In Arlon FESPA/ISA 2014, the CORB affirmed the Registration
Program’s refusal to register a three-dimensional trade show booth applied
for by Team One Display Services Inc. (“Team One”).277 In the CORB’s
words, the work consisted of “a three-dimensional trade show booth
comprised of multiple display elements, including two kiosks, two seating
areas, and a vehicle-display platform.”278 The decision showed multiple
images from the application, depicting the trade show booth from multiple
angles, as shown below.279

272. Id. at 5.
273. See Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1013–15 (2017).
274. UR5, CORB Decision at 5.
275. Id.
276. Id. citing U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES §
906.1 (common geometric shapes not copyrightable) and § 906.2 (familiar symbols and designs or mere
variations thereof not copyrightable) (3d ed. 2017).
277. Arlon FESPA/ISA 2014 Trade Show, CORB Decision at 1 (Dec. 14, 2017).
278. Id.
279. Id. at 2.
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Team One had argued that “‘the design or appearance of the trade show
booth is a 3-dimensional work of artistic craftsmanship’ that is conceptually
separable from the utilitarian aspects of the trade show booth”280 and that
“the overall trade show booth could be ‘visualized as a free-standing
sculpture or statuette . . . .”281
However, the CORB highlighted that Team One “repeatedly
suggest[ed]” in its appeals “that the trade show booth [was] a ‘useful
article,’” though it did “not identify any particular three-dimensional features
that could stand on their own as works of art apart from the trade show
booth.”282 Moreover, Team One never responded to a letter from the CORB
asking to clarify whether Team One sought to protect a “full-size three
dimensional version of the trade show booth,” a model replica, or the twodimensional images submitted as the deposit copy.283 Accordingly, the
CORB proceeded to evaluate the work as a full-size three-dimensional
display and reviewed whether it contained any conceptually separable
portions that could qualify for copyright protection.
The CORB disregarded the logos and designs on the trade show booth,
stating that Team One did not seek to register “any two-dimensional
authorship in the graphics applied to the surface of the trade-show booth
structure.”284 Interestingly, the CORB appears to have reviewed (apparently
sua sponte) Team One’s website, “which advertises the ability to apply
‘custom graphics’” to its displays.285 Based on the CORB’s review of Team
One’s website, the CORB noted that Team One’s client and not Team One
appeared to own the two-dimensional graphics depicted in the deposit
material, and suggested Team One would not be able to claim copyright in
material it did not own.286
Further, the CORB stated the Copyright Office “must focus on the
fixed, expressive elements” of the work to be registered.287 Confusingly, the
CORB decision highlighted that Team One “made clear that it is attempting
to claim the work as a single work, rather than a collection of component
works” in its application,288 but later, the CORB quoted Team One as stating,

280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Id. at 3 (quoting Letter from Daniel Bliss to U.S. Copyright Office (May 20, 2016)).
Id. at 9 (quoting Letter from Daniel Bliss to U.S. Copyright Office, at 2 (May 20, 2016)).
Arlon FESPA/ISA 2014 Trade Show, CORB Decision at 8.
Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 7 n.2.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 1.
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“[t]he design concept consists of original combinations, positioning, and
arrangement of materials . . . .”289
The CORB rejected any possible protection for ideas or “unprotectable
interior design concepts” as insufficiently fixed to merit copyright
protection.290 Query whether the outcome may have been different if Team
One described or defined “design concepts” instead as “concrete expressions
of design concepts.” In the author’s view, the CORB interpreted “concepts”
to mean “ideas,” and it is well-established that ideas are unprotectable under
copyright law.291
Finally, applying the Supreme Court’s test from Star Athletica, the
CORB held that the three-dimensional trade show booth did not contain any
conceptually separable, copyrightable features.292 For example, “[t]he
kiosks, if removed from the overall trade show booth, are still useful articles.
. . . The same is true of the Work’s vehicle display platform, television
monitors, stanchions, and seating areas.”293 The CORB left open the
possibility that some of the work’s details could be copyrightable.294 Without
more information, because Team One had not responded to the CORB’s
inquiry about certain features, the CORB presumed that all features were
“utilitarian aspects of the useful article itself.”295
What strikes the author as somewhat strange is that the work at issue
here does not look like a physical structure but instead looks like a twodimensional computer-generated display that appears as three-dimensional
on screen.296 The CORB noted that it interpreted the work as a “full-size
three-dimensional display” in the absence of any clarifying information from
the applicant. However, again it strikes the author that the CORB could have
rejected the application as incorrectly describing the work as threedimensional, or alternatively could have interpreted the application as a
claim to register the work as a collection of two-dimensional images of the
trade show booth setup.297
289. Id. at 7 (quoting Letter from Daniel Bliss to U.S. Copyright Office at 1–2 (May 20, 2016)).
290. Arlon FESPA/ISA 2014 Trade Show, CORB Decision at 7–8 (Dec. 14, 2017).
291. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any idea [or] . . . concept . . . .”).
292. Arlon FESPA/ISA 2014 Trade Show, CORB Decision at 6 & 9.
293. Id. at 8.
294. Id. at 9.
295. Id.
296. Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1260 (10th Cir. 2008)
(holding computer model replicas of Toyota vehicles not sufficiently original to merit copyright
protection; no discussion of conceptual separability); see also discussion supra Sections III(G)–(H).
297. See Floor Liner, CORB Decision at 2–3 (Apr. 19, 2018) (apparently transforming the applicant’s
application to register a sculptural claim in a work into a claim for a two-dimensional design) and
discussion supra Section IV (B)(5).
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The author submits that the CORB should have rejected the applicant’s
characterization of the computer model as a “useful article.” The statute
defines a “useful article” as “an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function
that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey
information.”298 Here, the computer model performs the function of
portraying the appearance of the article, the trade show booth, and
accordingly should not be considered a useful article. Instead, as the author
submits should have been the case as well in Ross and Glass Egg Digital
Media, the CORB should only consider whether the computer model was
sufficiently original.299
V. CONCLUSION AND THE FUTURE OF CONCEPTUAL
SEPARABILITY
What analyses and trends provide useful guideposts for applicants and
litigators? First, despite some subsequent lower courts ignoring the Supreme
Court’s instructions, the U.S. Supreme Court opinion specifically abrogates
any tests incorporating physical separability, the usefulness of any “left
behind” part of the object, and consideration of artistic judgment or
marketability.300 Lower courts and the CORB indicate it is helpful (but
generally not necessary) when litigants identify particular features to be
protected.301
Pulling together decisions from the first eighteen months post-Star
Athletica, we see the judge can make an independent determination about the
features to be protected,302 some part of the utilitarian object must be left
behind after separability,303 and physical separability rules the day as perhaps

298. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
299. See Meshwerks, Inc., 528 F.3d at 1258; see also supra Sections III(G)–(H). Cf. U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 919 (3d ed. revised Sept. 29, 2017)
(discussing copyrightability of physical models).
300. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1013–14 (2017).
301. Compare Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-03838-ODW (FFM), 2017 WL
4163990, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2017) (no identification of specific features to be protected) with Lego
A/S v. Best-Lock Constr. Toys, Inc., No. 3:11-cv-01586 (CSH), 2017 WL 6540268, at *6 n.6 (D. Conn.
Dec. 21, 2017) (no identification of specific features to be protected). See also Wanderer, CORB Decision
at 1 (Nov. 28, 2017); Trillane Strand, CORB Decision at 2 (July 27, 2017); Amaca, CORB Decision at 2
(July 27, 2017) (all identifying specific features to be protected). But see UR5, CORB Decision at 2 (Oct.
23, 2017); Pizza Slice Pool Float, CORB Decision at 2 (July 11, 2017) (both identifying specific features
to be protected); Arlon FESPA/ISA 2014 Trade Show, CORB Decision at 1 (Dec. 14, 2017) (no
identification of specific features to be protected).
302. See Inhale, Inc., 2017 WL 4163990, at *3; Lego A/S, 2017 WL 6540268, at *6 n.6.
303. See, e.g., Inhale, Inc., 2017 WL 4163990, at *3; Silvertop Assocs., Inc. v. Kangaroo Mfg., Inc.,
319 F. Supp. 3d 754, 764 (D.N.J. 2018).
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more easily, conceptually graspable.304 It follows that if a feature is
physically separable, it is also conceptually separable (e.g., black trim on
bikinis, light covers and sconces on lights). The trickier cases involve
conceptual separability of more integrated designs.305 In a sense, the
prohibition on registering copyright in useful articles, though prohibited by
statute,306 is a kind of “merger.”307
Copyright owners and litigants may consider Judge Forrest’s “primary
purpose” test to help demonstrate that a feature is “primarily” decorative or
artistic rather than functional, though the test is not binding on the CORB or
any court at this point.308 The “primary purpose” test may help to protect
some decorative features that also provide some utility. However, such a test
will not protect anything courts or the CORB consider useful as a whole, like
the Brandir bike rack or Inhale’s hookah water container,309 or with
potentially separable portions they consider not sufficiently original, like the
UR5 robot arm.310 Alternatively or in addition, litigants may enter Judge
Myerscough’s rhetorical realm of beat poetry by asking “once the
[decorative feature] / is removed from the [functional portion] / what is the
usefulness / of [e.g., hanging the bird on a string by its beak]?”311
While litigants must currently look elsewhere to protect useful articles
without conceptually separable parts, it is worth mentioning that copyright
law does protect some types of works we may consider useful, if not
constituting true “useful articles.”312 For example, copyright can protect
dictionaries, computer programs, and architecture.313 However, copyright
304. See Jetmax Ltd. v. Big Lots, Inc., Case No. 15-cv-9597 (KBF), 2017 WL 3726756, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2017); Triangl Grp. Ltd. v. Jiangmen City Xinhui Dist. Lingzhi Garment Co., Ltd.,
No. 16 Civ. 1498 PGG, 2017 WL 2829752, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2017).
305. See Silvertop Assocs. Inc., 319 F. Supp. 3d at 760; Floor Liner, CORB Decision at 2–3 (Apr.
19, 2018).
306. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 & 113.
307. See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03(B)(3) (2018)
(discussing the merger doctrine, which prohibits protecting expression inseparably tied to an idea, though
Nimmer and many courts take the view that the merger doctrine applies as a defense to infringement
rather than as part of the copyrightability analysis).
308. See Jetmax Ltd., 2017 WL 3726756, at *6. See supra Section III(D) for further discussion.
309. See Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987); Inhale Inc.,
2017 WL 4163990, at *3.
310. UR5, CORB Decision at 1 (Oct. 23, 2017).
311. See Design Ideas, Ltd. v. Meijer, Inc., No. 15-cv-03093, 2017 WL 2662473, at *3 (C.D. Ill. June
20, 2017) (virgules added). As above, the author credits Thomas Kjellberg of Cowen, Liebowitz &
Latman for his interpretation of Judge Myerscough’s words as beat poetry at the Copyright Society of the
USA’s Annual Meeting in June 2018.
312. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added) (defining “useful article”).
313. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 & 102. Credit to Joshua Simmons of Kirkland & Ellis LLP for his
observation about the protectability of some “useful” works, which he made on a panel where the author
also presented at the Fordham IP Conference in April 2018.
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law treats PGS works differently.314 When the Copyright Office and
Congress consider the Next Great Copyright Act,315 they should consider
why, and take the opportunity to clarify the conceptual separability test to
include Judge Forrest’s “primary purpose” language to more clearly
delineate what artistic features copyright owners may expect copyright law
to protect.
Two-dimensional works and two-dimensional computer models that
appear on screen as three-dimensional works present special problems, but
the author submits litigants and copyright applicants may better analyze
them outside of the conceptual separability framework. Such works can
reproduce the appearance of useful articles but are not themselves useful
articles.316 Congress should also clarify the definition of “useful article” in
the statute in this regard and the Copyright Office may address the issue in
its next revision of the Compendium as well. In the meantime, and for works
of all kinds, litigants should heed Justice Ginsburg’s implied guidance to
carefully consider the nature of the work at issue to determine, as a threshold
matter, whether the work constitutes a useful article at all.317
Finally, litigants will do well to remember the originality analysis,
though courts may elect to rule only on separability without considering
originality.318 Also, the CORB and the Copyright Office certainly consider
originality in determining registrability. As mentioned above, the Copyright
Office appears to hold applicants to a higher standard of originality as
compared to federal courts.319 Of course, sometimes courts, particularly
those inclined towards high art artistic judgment, use high standards for
originality as well.320

314. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 & 113.
315. See Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 315 (2013); see
also The Register’s Call for Updates to U.S. Copyright Law: Hearing before the H. Subcomm. on Courts,
Intell. Prop. and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 4–38 (2013) (statement of
Maria A. Pallante, Register of Copyrights, the U.S. Copyright Office).
316. See supra Sections III(G)–(H), IV(C)(3).
317. See Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1018-19 (2017) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring); see also supra Section II(C)(1). In the author’s opinion, Justice Ginsburg was smart to
concur rather than dissent so her opinion carries more persuasive authority for future cases.
318. See, e.g., Jetmax Ltd., 2017 WL 3726756, at *6.
319. See, e.g., Roberta Horton, The Threshold of Copyright Protection After American Airlines,
LAW360 (Feb. 26, 2018, 2:17 PM) https://www.law360.com/articles/1013278/the-threshold-ofcopyright-protection-after-american-airlines (“In our view, the courts have adopted more liberal
standards for evaluating creativity than has the Copyright Office, reflecting a tension between the
agency’s determinations and the courts’ more reasonable interpretations of ‘creativity.’”).
320. See, e.g., Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-03838-ODW (FFM), 2017 WL
4163990, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2017); L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491–92 (2d Cir.
1976).
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Decisions coming out of the CORB indicate that the originality analysis
closely follows, though is separate from, analyzing a useful article’s
separable parts for separability considerations.321 Congress and the
Copyright Office should clarify that the conceptual separability test does not
incorporate the originality analysis, as at least one court has conflated the
two, perhaps due to the particular language of the Supreme Court’s new
test.322
While courts have not consistently applied the Supreme Court’s
guidance, cases from the first eighteen months post-Star Athletica offer
useful guideposts and guardrails for addressing the copyrightability of
artistic features of useful articles. Litigants and courts can look at what Star
Athletica explicitly mandated courts and litigants not consider and can
review how the CORB implements the separability and originality analyses.
Also, courts and litigants may look to new tests from lower courts that
expand upon the Supreme Court’s return to the statutory test, such as Judge
Forrest’s “primary purpose” test, in order to determine what is “useful” postStar Athletica.

321. See, e.g., Pendant Lamp – 76, CORB Decision at 3 (Apr. 4, 2018); cf. supra Section II(B)
(questioning how a work could simultaneously meet the second part of the Supreme Court’s new
conceptual separability test for the feature to “qualify” as a PGS work and at the same time not satisfy
the statutory originality requirement).
322. See Triangl Grp. Ltd. v. Jiangmen City Xinhui Dist. Lingzhi Garment Co., Ltd., No. 16 Civ.
1498 PGG, 2017 WL 2829752, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2017); see also discussion at Section II(B) supra.

